Syria’s civil war is winding down, but its political challenges are about to morph into a tug-of-war between reformists who want to re-engage with the world and hard-liners who want to maintain strict control of the country’s economy and political system. And Russia — Damascus’ critical military ally whose intervention turned the tide on the battlefield — will be squarely lodged between them, forcing Moscow to increasingly play the role of mediator as it tries to end Syria’s seemingly endless cycles of violence without jeopardizing its position in the country.

Win the War to Lose the Peace?

The Syrian civil war has turned in al Assad’s favor since 2014-15, when the collapse of his military seemed possible after rebels seized major cities like Aleppo, Daraa and even suburbs in Damascus. Now in control of all of Syria’s major cities and with the rebels forced along the northern border with Turkey, the al Assad government appears poised to emerge from the war as the undisputed victor. Damascus now appears to have even come out on top of this summer’s battle over the southern city of Daraa, thanks to a fresh cease-fire agreement Russia brokered between regime and rebel forces.

But despite this conventional military supremacy, the Syrian government’s scorched-earth tactics have had a devastating economic and humanitarian toll, which Damascus has no clear way to address. The United Nations estimates it will cost around $500 billion to reconstruct the country’s ravaged infrastructure, which might be conservative given that a full survey of the damage has not been conducted. Years of conflict have also substantially changed Syria’s demographics, leaving roughly half a million people dead and forcing many more to flee. Of the country’s pre-war population of 21 million, only 17.5 million remain in the country. And of those still in Syria, 6.2 million are internally displaced and thus unable to contribute to the economy. The next generation of Syrians is also poorly positioned to contribute to the country’s future reconstruction, with many children having lost out on years of schooling in refugee camps.

And these problems have only worsened over the past year amid both the global and domestic economic fallout from COVID-19.In Syria, intermittent lockdowns have dampened economic activity in even relatively peaceful places, like Damascus. Meanwhile, Lebanon — a critical trade partner — is experiencing an economic collapse that’ll keep it financially constrained for the foreseeable future. And the international aid that’s helped prop up basic goods and services in for refugees in Syria has also waned, with the pandemic forcing countries to reign in spending and focus their attention back home. Roughly 75% of the population is now classified as food insecure, a 20% increase from 2020, according to ReliefWeb. And attempts to bring new donations into Syria have foundered amid the ongoing global health crisis, with new outbreaks popping up around the world.

Meanwhile, hopes to restart commercial ties with the Arab Gulf states, which are eager to find new business for their construction firms and to undermine Iran’s influence in Syria, have faltered amid the looming threat of U.S. retaliation, with the United States still legally bound to maintain strict sanctions under the Ceasar Syria Civilian Protection Act.

Against this backdrop, the first bubbles of a potential new phase of unrest have appeared. The worsening economic and social crises have manifested in protests even in government strongholds like Damascus, where Syrians have taken to the streets to voice their anger over fuel shortages among other grievances.

Reformists vs. Hard-Liners

As the military emergency of the civil war winds down, bread and butter issues are returning to the fore of Syria’s otherwise static politics. The Alawites, key supporters of the al Assad government, have become bolder in their public complaints of economic policies — pressuring Damascus to find ways to restore trade ties with the outside world. Some insiders have even become the victims of the government’s policies themselves. Amid the country’s increasingly dire financial situation, the al Assad regime has even begun to turn on insiders: In May 2020, the government seized the businesses and assets of Rami Maklouf, Syria’s richest man and a former member of al Assad’s inner circle, to help stem the country’s currency crisis.

The lifting of U.S.-led international sanctions, however, is contingent on the Syrian government holding successful negotiations with rival factions, like the remnants of the Free Syrian Army, the Syrian Intermin Government, and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces.

Reconnecting with the outside world would thus mean giving concessions to the opposition, likely take the form of a deal that either federalizes Syria, dilutes the presidency’s powers, or both — something that hard-liners in the regime, including al Assad himself, are loath to do. The Ba’athist system developed in Syria since the 1970 coup has focused intensely on the personal power of the al Assad clan, and there’s little indication that the inner circle is prepared to give way now, especially after securing such a strategic military victory in Daraa.

Russia’s Role in the Middle

Yet these hard-liners don’t have a full monopoly on what happens in Syria. The regime’s two key security partners Russia and Iran have a say as well, especially amid the thinning of Syrian military ranks over the past decade of war and depopulation. Russia, in particular, has already sent signals that it prefers a more low-risk approach to the civil war, preserving a detente with the United States while cutting de-escalation deals with both Syrian rebels and Turkey. As Syria’s economic isolation undercuts loyalist sentiment and threatens to resume civil unrest, Moscow also wants al Assad to uplift reformists within the government and push for reconciliation with at least some opposition groups. Russia ultimately wants the regime to move away from its scorched-earth military strategy for fear of purging yet more Syrians and pushing the country ever further away from reconstruction.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has avoided the Middle Eastern interventionism of its Soviet past, when it would sponsor coups and provoke civil wars for ideological ends. Now Russian interests in the Middle East typically focus on exploiting trends and regaining ground rather than trying to remake the map. And in Syria specifically, Russia has focused on preserving its naval base at Tartus and rebuilding credibility as a great power in the region — goals that have both relied on the al Assad government remaining in power. But as the Syrian civil war winds down, Russia may have to take greater risks in pursuit of its strategy.

If Russia decides to back al Assad even as the Syrian economy collapses further, Moscow will likely have to play a deeper role in deescalating tensions between the hard-liners who want to retain their place in power, and the reformists who want to break Syria out of isolation. In Daraa, Russia seems to have successfully avoided a costly military offensive by mediating between rebels and the regime — a role Moscow has also played in Idlib, eastern Damascus, and elsewhere in Syria. But now, Russia could face the prospect of having to balance the impoverished middle and merchant classes of Damascus and Alawites in Latakia against a hard-line inner circle. Those tensions may occasionally explode into violence, and although a repeat of the mass uprisings of 2011 is unlikely, such flare-ups could force the Russian military into a peacemaker role and turn its intervention into more of an occupation in parts of the country.

On the other hand, if Russia uses its influence to try to nudge the hard-liners toward reform, it risks alienating members of al Assad’s inner circle who are key to maintaining Moscow’s position in Syria. This hard-line inner circle also relies on Iranian support for much of its security, knowing that Tehran supports a total war to establish complete control over Syria, and as a result, might be emboldened to resist Russian entreaties to reform. Alienating regime loyalists could also force Moscow to choose between winding down its intervention in Syria at the risk of leaving the field to Iran and Syrian hard-liners, or potentially resurrecting its Cold War-era tactics of trying to choose the leaders of the countries it is allied with